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Isabel Grant* and
Debra Parkes*

Equality and the Defence of Provocation:
Irreconcilable Differences

Recent amendments to the defence of provocation have limited access to the
defence to those who are provoked by conduct that, if prosecuted, would have
been an indictable offence punishable by at least five years imprisonment. The
paper argues that these amendments are both over- and under-inclusive and fail
to confront the central problem surrounding provocation which is that it privileges
loss-of-control rage often in the context of male violence against women or in
response to same-sex advances. The paper supports the abolition of the
defence of provocation but only if mandatory minimum sentences for murder are
abolished providing trial judges sufficient discretion in sentencing to consider the
relevance of provocation.
Les récentes modifications apportées à la défense de provocation ont limité son
accès à ceux qui sont provoqués par une conduite qui, si elle avait fait l’objet
d’une poursuite, aurait constitué un acte criminel punissable d’au moins cinq ans
d’emprisonnement. L’article soutient que ces modifications sont à la fois trop et pas
assez inclusives et ne s’attaquent pas au problème central entourant la défense
de provocation, à savoir que sont privilégiées les accès de colère et la perte de
la maîtrise de soi, souvent dans le contexte de la violence des hommes contre les
femmes ou en réponse à des avances faites par une personne du même sexe.
Dans l’’article, nous préconisons l’abolition de la défense de provocation, mais
seulement si les peines minimales obligatoires pour meurtre sont abolies, ce qui
conférerait aux juges de première instance un pouvoir discrétionnaire suffisant
dans la détermination de la peine pour examiner la pertinence de la provocation.

* Peter A. Allard School of Law. The authors would like to thank Rebecca Coad, Laura DeVries,
Sarah Hannigan, Jean Murray and Kayla Strong for their research and editing assistance on this paper.
The authors also thank Elaine Craig for reading an earlier draft of this paper and making many helpful
suggestions.
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Introduction
The defence of provocation has long been the subject of vigorous debate
and calls for repeal or abolition across many jurisdictions.1 Until recently,
important developments in the law of provocation, which was added to the
Canadian Criminal Code in 1892, have been left to the judiciary.2 In July
2015, significant legislative amendments to the provocation defence came
into force,3 with very little consultation or input from lawyers or scholars
across the country. These changes were made in the name of preventing

1.
See, e.g., Kate Fitz-Gibbon, “Provocation in New South Wales: The need for abolition” (2012)
45:2 Austl & NZ J Crim 194; Adrian Howe, “Provoking Polemic—Provoked Killings and the Ethical
Paradoxes of the Postmodern Feminist Condition” (2002) 10:1 Fem Leg Stud 39; Andrée Côté, Diana
Majury & Elizabeth Sheehy, Stop Excusing Violence against Women (Ottawa: National Association
of Women and the Law, 2000); Joanne St. Lewis & Sheila Galloway, Reform of the Defence of
Provocation (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1995). The Response of the Canadian Association
of Elizabeth Fry Societies to Reforming Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and
Defence of Property, online: <http://www.caefs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Response-to-theDepartment-of-Justice-re-Reforming-Criminal-Code-Defences-Provocation-Self-Defence-andDefence-of-Property.pdf>; David Plater, Lucy Line & Kate Fitz-Gibbon, The Provoking Operation of
Provocation: Stage 1 (Adelaide: South Australian Law Reform Institute, 2017).
2.
For a more detailed history of the development of section 232, see Wayne Renke, “Calm like a
Bomb: An Assessment of the Partial Defence of Provocation” (2010) 47:3 Alta L Rev 729 at 730-735.
3.
SI/2015-0067.
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the use of the defence in honour killings.4 While reform of the defence
of provocation was overdue, the defence remains problematic because
Parliament chose to retain a standard based on the sudden loss of selfcontrol, changing only what types of insults could trigger the defence.
Provocation is described as a recognition of “human frailties which
sometimes lead people to act irrationally and impulsively.”5 The result
of a successful defence is to reduce what would otherwise be murder to
manslaughter, giving the trial judge flexibility in sentencing which is not
available under our current sentencing regime for murder.6 The substance
of the defence of provocation, prior to the recent amendments, was
provided for in ss. 232(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code as follows:
(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced
to manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of
passion caused by sudden provocation.
(2) A wrongful act or insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation
for the purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden
and before there was time for his passion to cool.

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that there is both an objective
component and a subjective component to this defence.7 The accused had
to raise a reasonable doubt that the provocation in question was a wrongful
act or insult sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and
that the accused actually lost self-control and acted suddenly before his
or her “passion” could cool. As we will discuss below, it is the objective
component of this test that has led to the most discussion and controversy.
Who is this ordinary person the accused is being judged against and what
characteristics can be attributed to this fictional person?
The defence of provocation is the only defence in the Criminal Code
that applies only to murder. There is no defence of provocation for a
man who, for example, loses his self-control in response to provocation,
assaults his spouse, and seriously injures her but does not kill her. There
is no defence where the accused tries to kill the victim and she survives

4.
House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 232 (16 June 2015) at 15122 (Hon Chris
Alexander): “We are also seeking to limit the defence of provocation, because honour, in whatever
form, is not an excuse for violence.”
5.
R v Thibert, [1996] 1 SCR 37 at para 4 [Thibert].
6.
Stephen Coughlan has suggested that s 232 may best be described as a sentencing provision, in
“Duress, Necessity, Self-Defence and Provocation: Implications of Radical Change” (2002) 7:2 Can
Crim L Rev 147 at 176 [Coughlan, “Duress, Necessity, Self Defence”].
7.
R v Tran, 2010 SCC 58, [2010] 3 SCR 350 [Tran].
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only through some fortuitous route.8 For all other crimes, we leave it to the
sentencing judge to determine whether the provocative acts of the victim
were in fact mitigating. The only reason to have a special defence that
applies only where the accused’s rage is lethal is to avoid the mandatory
minimum sentences for murder and, historically, the death penalty.9
In 2015, Parliament amended this defence but retained its underlying
premise of a sudden loss of self-control which is to be judged against the
standard of the ordinary person. Subsection 232(2) now reads:
Conduct of the victim that would constitute an indictable offence under
this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment and that
is of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the
power of self-control is provocation for the purposes of this section, if
the accused acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for their
passion to cool.10

The key change is that the triggering insult for the defence is now conduct
of the victim that would constitute an indictable offence punishable by five
years or more of incarceration instead of “a wrongful act or insult.”
In this paper we argue that there is no principled way to support a
defence premised on a sudden loss of control or sudden rage, often in the
context of male violence against women or homophobic rage. We share
the concerns of many critics of the defence who are hesitant to recommend
its abolition because the sentencing regime for murder is so inflexible and
harsh. However, if the sentencing regime for murder is flawed,11 we must
fix it, instead of perpetuating problematic defences to prop up a sentencing
structure that is too rigid. We had hoped that the clear statement by the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Tran12 about the need to limit the defence
of provocation to conform with equality rights would be a beacon for
future reform of the defence. However, while the recent amendments may
rule out some problematic cases, they fail to leave us with a principled way
of limiting the defence to cases where the loss-of-control response is truly
deserving of mitigation. Instead the amendments draw an arbitrary bright
line which will likely be both over-inclusive (in the sense of problematic

8.
R v Campbell (1977), 17 OR (2d) 673 (CA).
9.
See, e.g., Isabel Grant, “Rethinking the Sentencing Regime for Murder” (2001) 39:2 Osgoode
Hall LJ 655.
10. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 232(2) [emphasis added].
11. See Elizabeth Sheehy, “Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39:2
Osgoode Hall LJ 529; Elizabeth A Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons from the
Transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) [Sheehy, Defending Battered Women].
12. Tran, supra note 7.
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applications of the defence continuing) and under-inclusive (in the sense
of cases that deserve our compassion not being included) in its application.
We begin with a brief history of the defence of provocation and an
analysis of the problems that have arisen with its application. After a
consideration of the meaning of substantive equality in criminal law, we
examine the government’s response to the criticisms of provocation, and
assesses the extent to which the new defence heeds the call of the Supreme
Court of Canada to apply the defence in a manner that is consistent with
equality.13 In assessing options for reform, we consider the experience of
other jurisdictions which have amended or repealed the defence altogether.
Finally, we conclude that the defence of provocation should be abolished
but only if we also abandon mandatory minimum sentences for murder
which preclude trial judges from even considering whether there are
mitigating factors in a particular case.
I. Problems with the defence of provocation
Our long-standing definition of provocation, referencing a “wrongful act
or insult” demanded that courts and juries make normative assessments
about the types of insults that warrant reducing an otherwise intentional
killing from murder to manslaughter.14 The ordinary person standard has
always set the normative threshold against which we assess the types of
insults that deserve our compassion. It demands that we ask whether the
accused’s loss of self-control comports with the standard of human frailty
that we are willing to accept as ordinary. The defence of provocation,
therefore, gives a somewhat contradictory message: it calls for compassion
where the ordinary person would have lost control in response to the
victim’s insults, even though we expect that ordinary people do not kill
when insulted except in the most extraordinary circumstances.15 It is this
contradiction that has led to the widespread critique of the defence16 and,
in a number of jurisdictions, abolition or reform.17

13. Ibid; St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 1.
14. Renke argues that provocation is not about compassion but rather about calibrating the stigma for
murder: Renke, supra note 2.
15. On this point, see Victoria Nourse, “Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense” (1997) 106:5 Yale LJ 1331 at 1389.
16. See, e.g., Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 1; Côté, Majury & Sheehy, supra note 1; St. Lewis &
Galloway, supra note 1; Plater, Line & Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 1.
17. For example, New Zealand and three Australian states have abolished the defence of provocation.
See Carolyn B Ramsey, “Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law
Reform” (2010) 100:1 J Crim L & Criminology 33; Rosemary Hunter & Danielle Tyson, “The
Implementation of Feminist Law Reforms: The Case of Post-provocation Sentencing” (2017) 26:2
Soc & Leg Stud 129 [Hunter & Tyson, “The Implementation of Feminist Law Reforms”].
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1. The evolution of the defence of provocation
The provocation defence developed at a time when murder was punishable
by death and thus defences that reduced murder to manslaughter could be
the difference between life and death. It was assumed that if killings were
sudden, spontaneous, and in the heat of passion, they were less blameworthy
and not deserving of the ultimate sentence of death. However, not all
losses of self-control were equally deserving of compassion. The history
of the defence sheds light on its gendered and homophobic underpinnings.
Early cases centred around three types of situations considered to be
provocative: (1) “chance medley” or a spontaneous fight between men;
(2) a man discovering his wife in the act of adultery; and (3) a father
discovering a man in the act of anal sex with his son.18 With respect to
adultery, for example, a similar doctrine did not exist for a woman who
found her husband in bed with another woman because the defence was
related to the concept of the wife as the property of her husband, as
reflected in the expression “Jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is
the highest invasion of property.”19
Gradually, courts abandoned the category-based approach to
provocation, expanding the defence to include any killing where an
ordinary person, faced with a similar insult, would have lost self-control,
so long as the accused actually did lose self-control. This relaxation in
the rigidity of the categories led to an expansion of the defence and an
increase in the types of insults that would qualify as provocation. A 1997
American study of provocation demonstrated that the category of adultery,
for example, had expanded significantly to include women who were
merely trying to leave a relationship:
…contrary to popular understandings, men’s provocation claims are not
based on sexual infidelity, but rather 65% of men’s claim studied by
Nourse were made in the context of a relationship that was over, ending,
or from which the woman was attempting to exit. Twenty-six percent
of the provocation claims that reached the jury involved no claim of
infidelity whatsoever, but simply departure by the woman.20

The issue that has attracted the most attention both in scholarship and case
law is which characteristics of the accused should be incorporated into
the ordinary person for purposes of the assessment. Historically, Canadian
courts took a narrow approach, refusing to recognize the accused’s personal
18. DPP v Camplin, [1978] AC 705, Lord Diplock, cited in Toni Pickard et al, Dimensions of
Criminal Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montomery, 2002) at 811.
19. R v Mawgridge (1708), 84 ER 1107 at 1115 (QB), cited in Tran, supra note 7 at para 15.
20. Côté, Majury & Sheehy, supra note 1 at 9, citing Nourse, supra note 15 at 1345.
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characteristics and the circumstances surrounding the insult because doing
so would undermine the normative function of the ordinary person test.21
This meant not that the ordinary person had no characteristics but rather
that he (and occasionally she) was implicitly ascribed the characteristics
associated with the dominant group.22 In R. v. Hill,23 the Supreme Court
of Canada expanded the scope of the objective test and allowed the jury
to consider an ordinary person with the characteristics of the accused that
“do not detract from a person’s characterization as ordinary.”24 In other
words, it was recognized that the ordinary person has, among other things,
a sex, an age, and a race. In R. v. Thibert, the Court went even further in
personalizing the objective test in the context of a man who killed his
estranged wife’s new partner. The majority noted the ordinary person, in
this case, was a married man, faced with the breakup of his marriage.25
Many commentators thought it was a positive development to allow
consideration of sex, age, race, and other factors into the assessment of
what the ordinary person would do,26 in part because no one exists in the
absence of these characteristics. Yet some thought that Thibert went too
far in this direction27 because the more we subjectify the objective test to
include various personal characteristics, the less it serves as a meaningful
limit on the types of killings worthy of compassion.
There are contexts where adding individual characteristics to the
ordinary person test could contextualize the insult. The following example
was given in Hill: “For example, if the provocation is a racial slur, the jury
will think of an ordinary person with the racial background that forms
the substance of the insult.”28 However, with a few notable exceptions,

21. R v Wright, [1969] SCR 335; R v Parnerkar, [1974] SCR 449.
22. Stephen G Coughlan, “Annotation: R. v. Humaid” (2006) 37 CR (6th) 349 at 347 [Coughlan,
“Humaid”].
23. R v Hill, [1986] 1 SCR 313 [Hill SCC]. At issue in Hill was the availability of provocation where
a 16-year-old man had killed an older man who Hill alleged had made a sexual advance.
24. Ibid at para 35, Dickson CJC.
25. Thibert, supra note 5 at para 24.
26. See, e.g., Don Stuart, Steve Coughlan & Ronald J Delisle, Learning Canadian Criminal Law
(Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 1012–1013. See also Morris Manning & Peter Sankoff, Manning,
Mewett & Sankoff: Criminal Law, 4th ed (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) at 762-764.
The authors applaud the flexibility Hill introduced, but described the decision as being “regrettably
concise” and criticized several passages for being “terribly sloppy.”
27. See, e.g., Wayne Gorman, “Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence” (1999) 42:4 Crim LQ
at 495-496.
28. Hill SCC, supra note 23 at para 35, Dickson CJC.
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these are not the scenarios we are seeing in the case law.29 Furthermore,
sex and sexual orientation, in particular, have not always been added to
the ordinary person test in a manner that reflects equality. For example,
losing one’s self-control out of sexual jealousy has been conceptualized
as ordinary for heterosexual men. In Hill, taking sex into account was
essentially acknowledging that it is ordinary for a (heterosexual) man,
faced with a same-sex advance, to respond violently. Suggesting in Hill
that sex was relevant implies that if the accused had been a woman, a
loss of control might not have been ordinary. Justice Wilson in her dissent
in Hill was explicit on this point: “the fact that the victim of the sexual
assault, the accused, is a male and that the attack is a homosexual one may
properly be considered.”30
In Tran, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously rejected
provocation as a defence in a case where a racialized man had killed
his estranged wife’s new partner and seriously injured her.31 The Court
made it clear that not all losses of self-control will be excused; only those
based on a “justifiable sense of being wronged.”32 The defence should
only be successful where, “as a result of human frailties, the accused
reacted inappropriately and disproportionately, but understandably to a
sufficiently serious wrongful act or insult.”33 In Tran, possibly in response
to the criticism of Thibert, the Court stressed the importance of keeping
provocation consistent with principles of equality:
[T]he ordinary person standard must be informed by contemporary norms
of behaviour, including fundamental values such as the commitment to
equality provided for in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
For example, it would be appropriate to ascribe to the ordinary person
relevant racial characteristics if the accused were the recipient of a racial

29. For a case where the provoking insult was based on a personal characteristic of the accused as
intended in Hill, see R v Krasny, 2014 MBQB 237 [Krasny] which involved a young male accused
who had significant mental and physical disabilities. He was punched and taunted by the victim at a
party [e.g. called a “retard”]. The trial judge stated at para 63:
[N]ot only did [the victim] push and shove [the accused], he was also taunting him with
insults and verbal abuse including calling him names related to his mental disability.
The law is clear that an insult includes injuriously contemptuous speech or behaviour, a
scornful utterance, as well as an action to insult another person’s self respect and cause an
affront to his or her dignity.
The trial judge, after citing the passage on equality from Tran and section 15 of the Charter, accepted
that the accused’s mental disability was relevant to put the victim’s insults and taunts into context and
as to whether an ordinary person would have lost the power of self-control in response to the insults.
The provocation defence was thus successful and the accused was convicted of manslaughter.
30. Hill SCC, supra note 23 at para 82, Wilson J.
31. Tran, supra note 7.
32. Ibid at para 22 [emphasis omitted].
33. Ibid.
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slur, but it would not be appropriate to ascribe to the ordinary person the
characteristic of being homophobic if the accused were the recipient of
a homosexual advance. Similarly, there can be no place in this objective
standard for antiquated beliefs such as “adultery is the highest invasion
of property….”34

The Court was as clear as it could be here that race and sexual orientation
may be relevant but only where the accused was responding to, rather than
acting on, racism or homophobia.35
Clearly, the more the objective test is personalized, and if it is only
personalized in one direction, the less it serves as a tool to limit the excusing
of homicidal rage. The Ontario Court of Appeal has refused to personalize
the objective test in the other direction, i.e., it refused to consider the
characteristics of the accused that made his loss of control less ordinary
in the circumstances. In a 2015 case also called R. v. Hill,36 the Court of
Appeal considered the availability of provocation where the trial judge had
instructed the jury to consider the accused’s considerable physical size and
strength advantage over that of his female victim in assessing whether an
ordinary person would have lost self-control in response to a “relatively
minor assault and insults.”37 The Court of Appeal found this to be in error
because his provocation defence was “purely rage-based” and not based on
fear of his young, pregnant victim.38
There is merit to the submission that by inviting the jury to compare the
respective size of the appellant and [the victim] as part of the ordinary
person test, the jury may have taken the trial judge to be instructing them
that the reasonableness or even justifiability of the appellant’s response
to [the victim’s] provocative acts was a relevant consideration in the
application of the ordinary person test. Unlike some defences, e.g. selfdefence and duress, provocation does not measure the conduct of the
accused against standards of reasonableness or proportionality.39

The precise nature of the provocation in this case is vague at best. The victim
and the accused met to discuss the victim’s pregnancy (the accused was the
biological father but both were involved in relationships with other people).
When the accused confessed to police, he claimed that the victim fell as
they were leaving the house and then looked at him and said, “If this baby’s

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Ibid at para 34.
See, e.g., Krasny, supra note 29.
2015 ONCA 616, 330 CCC (3d) 1, 339 OAC 90 [Hill ONCA].
Ibid at para 70.
Ibid at paras 84-88.
Ibid at para 88.
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like, this baby’s gone, it’s your fault, I’m telling everyone it was you.”40
He then admitted choking her for approximately three minutes. At trial, the
story changed somewhat. According to his testimony, when the victim fell
she claimed she would tell everyone that he had thrown her down the stairs.
She was screaming obscenities at him and, after falling a second time, she
struck him in the face knocking his glasses off. Regardless of which story is
correct, after strangling her for three minutes he hid her body in the bushes,
lied to the police and the victim’s family about his actions, and forged a
letter from the victim saying she had gone away for a while. The Court of
Appeal acknowledged that this was a very close case but nonetheless felt
that provocation should have gone to the jury without any reference to the
accused’s size advantage. If the Ontario Court of Appeal is correct that the
accused’s size and strength advantage is not relevant, and his response does
not have to be subjected to a standard of reasonableness, what is the normative
function played by the ordinary person test in this case? More importantly,
is pure rage in the face of a minor insult really something the law should
mitigate? There were many factors in Hill suggesting that a mandatory life
sentence, and the accompanying parole ineligibility, for murder would be
excessive for this accused: he was young, Indigenous, apparently “a role
model for others” and described as “considerate, non-violent and kind,”41
although such descriptions are not unusual in the context of male violence
against women. All of these factors might well warrant a less harsh sentence
for murder than our law allows. However, they have nothing to do with
provocation and the trivial insult on the part of the victim just provides an
excuse to allow the Court to acknowledge in sentencing factors that our rigid
law otherwise precludes. Further, the focus of the provocation defence on the
victim’s behaviour does imply that, to some extent, it was her behaviour that
brought about the accused’s violence and in this respect that she “asked for
it”: Given that this case allegedly involved a minor assault by the victim, the
new amendments would not preclude the defence of provocation.
No area of provocation has been more controversial than its applicability
in so-called “honour killing” cases where a racialized accused relies on his
culture, and beliefs “typically” held in that culture, to inform the ordinary
person. These cases involve lethal male violence against (almost always)
a woman, often the accused’s spouse or another family member, who has

40.
41.

Ibid at para 13.
Ibid at para 6.
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allegedly departed from culturally expected norms of behaviour.42 Tellingly,
the amendments to the provocation defence were enacted with a package
of other legislative changes in the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural
Practices Act.43 The stated motivation behind the changes was to prevent use
of the defence in cases of “honour killings.”44 This is so despite the fact that
Canadian courts and juries have consistently rejected such claims.45
In fact, it is not racialized, non-Western “others” who have benefited
most from the provocation defence. Successful defences have been rooted
in discriminatory assumptions very much a part of Canadian culture.
Provocation, to a certain extent, is always a “cultural” defence—but not
one of foreign, “barbaric” cultures contemplated by the new legislation.46
The insults that we acknowledge as justifying mitigation reflect the values
that we choose to accept in Canadian society. Historically, those have
not always been equality-promoting values.47 We still see attempts to use
provocation to justify killings in the face of male jealousy when women
try to leave a relationship and where a man responds with deadly force to
a same-sex advance. While some might argue that we have moved past
these types of cases with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Tran,48 this problematic reasoning is still with us post-Tran.49 The new
amendments will not rule out the defence where, as in many of these cases,
there is an allegation that the victim assaulted the accused before deadly
force was used.50

42. See, e.g., R v Humaid, 2006 CanLII 12287 (ONCA), 81 OR (3d) 456 (CA) [Humaid]; Rosemary
Cairns Way, “Culture, Religion and the Ordinary Person: An Essay on R. v. Humaid” (2009) 41:1
Ottawa L Rev 1; Sherene H Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslms from Western Law and
Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
43. Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Civil Marriage Act
and the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015
(assented to 18 June 2015), SC 2015, c 29, s 7.
44. Senate, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 41st Parl,
2nd Sess, Issue 14 (8 December 2014) [Senate Standing Committee, 8 December 2014].
45. See, e.g., Humaid, supra note 42; R v Li, 2007 ONCA 136, 221 OAC 179 [Li]; Pascale Fournier,
Pascal McDougall & Anna R Dekker, “Dishonour, Provocation and Culture: Through the Beholder’s
Eye?” (2012) 16:2 Can Crim L Rev 161; R v Shafia, 2016 ONCA 812, 341 CCC (3d) 354, [2016] OJ
No 5627 (QL) [Shafia].
46. We are not the first to describe provocation as a cultural defence. See, e.g., Stephen G Coughlan,
“The Omission of Provocation from a General Part” in Don Stuart, RJ Deslisle & Allan Manson,
eds, Towards A Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999)
243 at 246.
47. Coughlan, “Humaid,” supra note 22.
48. Kent W Roach et al, “Vandalizing the Criminal Code with Irrational and Arbitrary Restrictions
on Provocation” (2015) 62 Crim LQ 403.
49. See, e.g., R v Rasberry, 2017 ABCA 135 [Rasberry]; R v Angelis, 2013 ONCA 70, 296 CCC (3d)
143, 99 CR (6th) 315 [Angelis].
50. See Rasberry, ibid.
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2. The impossibility of incorporating equality into the defence of
provocation
Rosemary Cairns Way has argued that “the most destabilizing…truth about
criminal law which has emerged over the last 30 years [of the Charter]
is that the criminal law raises equality issues.”51 Cairns Way suggests
that “incorporating equality [into substantive criminal law] requires
deliberate attention to perspective, context, power, vulnerability, presence
and absence.”52 Attention to substantive equality complicates the classic
conception of the criminal law as about balancing the state power to punish
against the individual rights of accused persons. It involves “thinking
about the overall burdens and benefits of criminal prohibitions,”53 about the
unequal positions of certain groups of victims and perpetrators, and about
the context of social inequality in which the criminal law has developed
and is enforced. Reforms to sexual assault law in the Charter era have
been perhaps the most salient examples of substantive equality informing
criminal law doctrine.54 But what does it mean to say that the defence of
provocation must be consistent with values of equality? Formal equality
would mean that the defence is equally available to all groups of accused
persons. Historically, this has not been the case for provocation but the
defence is now at least formally available to anyone charged with murder.
However, when one examines the types of killings committed by men
and women, for example, we learn that provocation is still largely a male
defence because of the way the defence has been interpreted and applied in
conjunction with the reality that culpable homicides, and especially those
based on out-of-control rage, are overwhelmingly committed by men.55
Substantive equality “seeks to accommodate the varied needs and
experiences of subordinated groups.”56 In “Contextualizing Criminal
51. Rosemary Cairns Way, “Attending to Equality: Criminal Law, the Charter and Competitive
Truths” (2012) 57 SCLR (2d) 39 at 40 [Cairns Way, “Attending to Equality”].
52. Ibid.
53. Christine Boyle, “The Role of Equality in the Criminal Law” (1994) 58:1 Sask L Rev 203 at 207.
54. Cairns Way, “Attending to Equality,” supra note 51 at 49-51. But see Emma Cunliffe, “Sexual
Assault Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Losing Sight of Substantive Equality?” (2012) 57
SCLR 295 (discussing the ongoing challenge of infusing sexual assault law with equality).
55. Danielle Tyson, “Victoria’s New Homicide Laws: Provocative Reforms or More Stories of
Women ‘asking for it’” (2011) 23:2 Current Issues Crim Just 203 at 208 [Tyson, “Victoria’s New
Homicide Laws”]; Caroline Forell, “Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the
United States, Canada and Australia” (2006) 14:1 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 27 [Forell, “Gender
Equality”]; Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide for Battered
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand” (2012) 34:3 Sydney
L Rev 467 at 482 [Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide”]. See also Stella Tarrant, “The
‘Specific Triggering Incident’ in Provocation: Is the Law Gender Biased?” (1996) 26:1 UW Austl L
Rev 190 for an analysis of whether the requirement is discriminatory under Australian law.
56. See Forell, “Gender Equality,” ibid at 29.
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Defences,” we argued that locating a defence in its factual and social
context is an important step towards achieving substantive equality.57 We
suggested that there are two ways in which context should inform an analysis
of defences. First, the context should help us understand the accused’s
actions. Second, and more importantly, a contextual inquiry should help
“to locate the defence itself within its social and historical context and
to reveal biases and inequalities reflected therein.”58 The best example of
the Court recognizing context in a defence can be found in the decision
in R. v. Lavallee,59 where self-defence was located within the context of
the historical inequality of women, the relative inequality between men
and women in terms of size and physical strength, and the history of
self-defence which evolved with male-to-male combat in mind. This was
easier for self-defence because it was the absence of the defence for some
accused that created inequality. The task is more difficult with provocation
where it is the values underlying the defence itself that challenge equality.
Attempting to imbue the provocation defence with the value of substantive
equality requires rejecting a number of the discriminatory assumptions
about what types of conduct will lead ordinary people to lose self-control
and even about whether an angry loss of self-control should be mitigating
at all. Just because some men react to being rejected by women or to a
same-sex sexual advance with lethal violence does not make it ordinary
and does not necessarily make it worthy of our compassion. Caroline
Forell argues that a more radical approach is required:
Substantive gender equality insists that the law take into account and
respond to the actual effect of a rule on both men and women, thereby
better assuring that justice for all is achieved. It requires more than just
making the provocation defense available to both men and women who
kill out of jealousy and rage, or out of fear and despair. Instead, applying
substantive equality would mean that killing in a heat of passion out
of sexual possessiveness would no longer be an acceptable basis for a
claim of provocation because everyone has a right to sexual and physical
autonomy. Applying substantive equality would also mean that killing
one’s batterer out of fear would often be a basis for self-defense because
everyone has a right to defend him or herself against physical harm.
If substantive gender equality were considered adequately, killings out
of jealousy and rage would result in murder convictions, while most
killings out of fear and despair would result in acquittals.60
57. Isabel Grant & Debra Parkes, “Contextualizing Criminal Defences: Exploring the Contribution
of Justice Bertha Wilson” in Kim Brooks, ed, Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s Difference
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 153 [Grant & Parkes, “Contextualizing Criminal Defences”].
58. Ibid at 154.
59. R v Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 852 [Lavallee].
60. Forell, “Gender Equality,” supra note 55 at 30 (citations omitted).
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Aya Gruber suggests that attempting to bring substantive equality into
defences and other criminal law doctrines “has a tendency to reduce to
the notion that we should simply do whatever favours the (identified)
woman in any given case.”61 But given the extent to which women have
been disadvantaged by the historical development of legal doctrine
around male violence, to some extent it is not surprising if reform efforts
appear to be focused on maximizing protection for women and other
marginalized groups, and trying to right the historical inequality. With
these cautions in mind, we demonstrate that developments in the law of
provocation have not yet achieved substantive equality. We examine two
contexts in which inadequate attention to equality has resulted in an overinclusive application of the defence: men killing their female partners and
“homosexual panic” cases. We also briefly discuss the difficulty in raising
provocation for women who kill their abusers, where the under-inclusive
application of the defence has been problematic. We are not the first to
critique these types of cases62 but it is disconcerting that the call to heed
Charter values in Tran has not eliminated them.
3. Provocation and intimate femicide
Every year, approximately 60 women in Canada are killed by their
(former) intimate partners. Women are at greatest risk when they separate,
or announce their intent to separate, from their male partners.63 Canadian
statistics suggest that, while the number of spousal homicides has remained
relatively constant in recent years, the number of female victims has
increased while the number of male victims is in decline.64 Women commit
spousal homicide far less often than men65 and for different reasons. Men
are more likely to kill out of sexual jealousy, a sense of entitlement to
their female partners or a twisted sense of male honour.66 In cases where
provocation is at issue, threats to leave the relationship67 and/or taunts
61. Aya Gruber, “A Provocative Defense” (2015) 103:2 Cal L Rev 273 at 313.
62. See, e.g., The Response of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies to Reforming
Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and Defence of Property, supra note 1; St. Lewis
& Galloway, supra note 1; Côté, Majury & Sheehy, supra note 1; N Kathleen (Sam) Banks, “The
‘Homosexual Panic’ Defence in Canadian Criminal Law” (1997), 1 CR (5th) 371.
63. Isabel Grant, “Intimate Femicide: A Study of Sentencing Trends for Men Who Kill Their
Intimate Partners” (2010) 47:3 Alta L Rev 779 at 780 [Grant, “Intimate Femicide”].
64. Maire Sinha, “Family violence in Canada: A statistical profile, 2011” (2013) 85:2 Juristat 1 at 47.
These numbers underestimate the scope of the problem because men also kill their former partner’s
new male partners, which are killings that are not labelled as spousal in nature.
65. One study found that more than 75% of all spousal homicides in Canada were committed by men
against women: Valerie Pottie Bunge, “National Trends in Intimate Partner Homicides, 1974–2000”
(2002) 22:5 Juristat 1 at 13.
66. Ibid at 7.
67. R v Pasqualino, 2008 ONCA 554, 233 CCC (3d) 319, 239 OAC 59.
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about sexual inadequacy68 are sometimes the provoking insult. Women are
more likely to raise provocation where they have killed an abusive spouse
out of fear or despair where self-defence is likely the more appropriate
defence, although difficulties may arise in its application.69 As described
by Danielle Tyson, provocation does not typically fit the circumstances of
women who kill an intimate partner:
When women kill an intimate partner, they typically do so in circumstances
where they are not responding to a specific triggering incident that
is legally required before a successful defence of provocation can be
made out. Rather, when women kill they are usually responding to a
past history of violence and abuse by the deceased. Although deserving
of mitigation, women who kill their violent abusers often fail to satisfy
the rules and requirements that structure the partial defence resulting in
either the distortion or exclusion of their experiences.
In contrast, men who kill their intimate partners or ex-partners usually
kill in response to much slighter provocation—she either ‘nagged’,
‘taunted’, ‘insulted’ or ‘goaded’ him, ‘flirted’ with another man, ‘flaunted’
her infidelity, left the relationship or expressed a desire to leave him.
Men who kill in this context, however, have been able to rely on the
defence of provocation with relative ease.70

A 1998 Canadian Department of Justice study found 115 cases in which
provocation was raised:
62 involved domestic homicides: 55 in which men killed women, and
7 in which women killed men. The remaining 53 cases involved men
killed by men, and of those, 16 involved allegations of a “homosexual
advance”, 8 involved an altercation over intimate relations with the
perpetrator’s current or estranged female partner, and the remaining 29
involved men who had no special relationships.71

Two Canadian studies have examined the success rate of the defence of
provocation in cases involving gendered intimate violence. In a study of
sentencing for spousal homicides committed by men, Isabel Grant found
that provocation was argued in 37 of 252 spousal murder cases and was
successful in only seven of the cases, although in two additional cases the
Court of Appeal sent the case back for a new trial because of errors in the

68. Ibid; R v Kimpe, 2010 ONCA 812, 271 OAC 21.
69. Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63; Jenny Morgan, “Provocation Law and Facts: Dead
Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them” (1997) 21:1 Melbourne UL Rev 237 at 256-257.
70. Tyson, “Victoria’s New Homicide Laws,” supra note 55 at 208 (citations omitted).
71. Department of Justice, “Reforming Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, Self-defence, and
Defence of Property” (1998) at 4, cited in Pickard et al, supra note 18 at 812.
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charge on provocation.72 However, there were many more cases where
provocation was put to the jury and was unsuccessful on the facts. Pascale
Fournier and her colleagues examined honour killings in Canada which,
while not all spousal in nature, are based on notions of gendered entitlement
to control women’s sexuality.73 The authors concluded that the success
rate for the defence was 11% for non-Western or Other(ed)74 defendants
and 25% for Western defendants.75 This latter finding demonstrates the
relatively high rate of success for the defence when Western men kill their
spouses or other family members. The significant differential between
the two groups suggests that we recognize the problematic dimensions
of importing discriminatory “cultural values” into cases dealing with
an accused from foreign cultures but we do not even recognize we are
importing cultural values when dealing with Western accused.76 As the
authors conclude, “however right the harsh punishment of honour crimes
may be, this has the potential to conceal Western femicidal behaviour, an
unintended consequence we should be wary of.”77
The high point of incorporating discriminatory values into provocation
was also the high point of subjectifying the ordinary person test in
provocation doctrine. In Thibert, the accused confronted his estranged
spouse and her new partner with a loaded rifle in a parking lot. He claimed
he wanted to speak to his wife alone. Her new partner, the victim, told the
accused, “Come on big fellow, shoot me,” as he stood with the accused’s
wife in front of him. The accused shot him with a rifle with which he had
originally planned to kill the deceased or his wife, and later apparently
changed that plan to suicide.78 The majority held that provocation should
have gone to the jury, and that the ordinary person should be constructed
as the married man faced with the breakup of his marriage, implying that
a loss of self-control is ordinary in this context. The dissent pointed out in
powerful terms that “no one has either an emotional or proprietary right

72. Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63.
73. Fournier, McDougall & Dekker, supra note 45.
74. Ibid. This study analyzed a series of Canadian cases of intimate femicide from 1990–2010
in which the male defendants raised the provocation defence. In categorizing the defendants’
backgrounds as either “Western” or “Other”(ed), the authors relied on the names of the parties and
the other information revealed in the decisions. Cases in which no mention was made of a particular
“other” ethnic origin were included in the “Western” category.
75. Ibid. For a description of similar findings in other jurisdictions see Danielle Tyson, Sex,
Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (New York: Routledge, 2013) at 38-39. [Tyson, Sex,
Culpability and Provocation].
76. Razack, supra note 42.
77. Fournier, McDougall & Dekker, supra note 45 at 188.
78. Thibert, supra note 5 at paras 26, 39, 42.
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or interest in his spouse that would justify the loss of self-control that the
[accused] exhibited.”79
While this type of reasoning is less common after Tran, remnants of
it can be seen in the post-Tran case law. For example, in R. v. Angelis,80
the accused was charged with murdering his wife after smothering or
strangling her during a physical altercation in front of their two young
children. He testified that she suddenly attacked him, scratching his face
and clawing his penis. His young daughter testified to the contrary that the
two had been fighting about money. The context was that the accused had
recently learned that the victim had been having a long-term relationship
with another man and wanted out of the marriage. Apparently the accused
straddled the victim, covered her mouth with his hand, and held her down
to “defend” himself. She weighed 95 pounds and was 4'9" tall. He weighed
150 pounds and was 5'6" tall. After her death he did not administer CPR
even though he was a trained nurse, and he waited three or four hours
before calling 911. The trial judge refused to put provocation to the jury
and the jury convicted the accused of murder, thus clearly rejecting both
self-defence and the argument that the Crown had failed to prove mens
rea.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was wrong to refuse to
put provocation to the jury. The disagreement in this case was actually
about the subjective component of provocation although the Court’s
analysis shed some light on the construction of ordinariness in spousal
violence. The Court held that there was evidence to support the subjective
component of provocation beyond the accused’s denial that he was
angry.81 The Court of Appeal cited four pieces of evidence to support the
assertion of provocation. First, a neighbour had heard the accused yell
the word “bitch” at his wife mere moments before the struggle ended,
thus suggesting the attack was sudden. Second, he killed his wife in front
of their two children even though he undeniably loved his children. This
fact apparently demonstrated that he was not in control when he killed
his wife. Third, the killing was out of character for the accused: “it is
hard to understand why a mild-mannered civil servant with no history of
violence or abuse in his relationship with his wife would turn on her in an
instant and then panic after—unless he acted out of such rage.”82 Finally,
the fact that the victim had attacked the most intimate part of his body, his

79.
80.
81.
82.

Thibert, ibid at para 65.
Angelis, supra note 49.
Ibid at para 41.
Ibid.
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penis, also led the Court to conclude that it could be inferred that he lost
self-control. The Court would have substituted a verdict of manslaughter
on the basis of these errors about provocation but because the trial judge
made other errors, a new trial was ordered.
These conclusions reflect a number of problematic stereotypes about
domestic violence and its perpetrators which are relied upon by the
appellate court to support provocation. The suggestion that mild-mannered
civil servants do not abuse their wives unless provoked belies the fact that
domestic violence exists across all social groups. We also do not have
access to the victim’s account of their relationship. The notion that violence
is “out of character” for an accused is often used to minimize the impact
of domestic violence.83 The horrific fact that two young children watched
their mother be killed is treated as supporting a defence of provocation. In
fact, social science literature demonstrates that the presence of children
generally does not protect women from lethal violence and that, in fact, far
too many children witness their mothers being killed.84
In R. v. Khairi,85 the accused killed his wife by brutally slicing through
her neck and voicebox and stabbing her multiple times. The killing took
place at the family apartment where they lived with their six children
after she had told him she was going to leave the relationship and take
the children with her. While the jury rejected the defence of provocation,
it is concerning that the trial judge found an air of reality to the defence
since there appears to be no evidence of a sufficiently grave insult that
could trigger the defence. Clearly some trial judges still take the view
that a woman communicating that she is leaving an abusive relationship
constitutes sufficient provocation to put the defence to the jury.
Another line of cases demonstrates that alleged taunts by a woman
about a man’s sexual prowess can trigger a provocation defence.86 This
issue perpetuates the stereotype that men have no control over actions
83. See, e.g., R v Pakoo, 2004 MBCA 157, 198 CCC (3d) 122, 25 CR (6th) 277, 198 CCC (3d) 122,
25 CR (6th) 277; R v McCowan, 2010 MBCA 45, 251 Man R (2d) 295.
84. Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63 at 780-781. One study which examined intimate
femicides from 1974–1994 found that 100 children witnessed their mothers being killed: Rosemary
Gartner, Myrna Dawson & Maria Crawford, “Woman Killing: Intimate Femicide in Ontario, 1974–
1994” (1998) 26 Resources for Feminist Research 151 at 163.
85. 2015 ONCA 279, [2015] OJ No 2054 (QL).
86. R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290 [Stone] involved a man who brutally
stabbed his wife 47 times in response to her alleged verbal abuse of him which included a reference
to his poor sexual performance. While it is not possible to determine from the judgment whether
provocation or lack of mens rea led to the jury verdict of manslaughter, the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the conclusion that the victim’s provocation could be considered as a mitigating factor in
sentencing even though the mitigation of provocation had already reduced the crime from murder to
manslaughter.
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related to sexual activity and that an insult about their sexual prowess
necessarily makes a loss of self-control ordinary. Losing self-control
over an insult to one’s sexual prowess is a gendered rage response that is
normalized in our law and culture. We could find no such cases involving
women killing men for such insults.
The recent decision of R. v. Evans,87 while not a spousal case, is
instructive about the role of statements regarding the accused’s sexual
performance. The accused’s evidence was that he was drunk and could not
get an erection. The victim, a woman he had just met that night, mentioned
that he was probably too drunk to get an erection. The accused argued that
this comment might have been what caused him to fly into a rage and kill
her, because he took her pointing out this obvious fact as “being made fun
of.”88 The Court of Appeal rightly rejected her statement as the basis for
a provocation defence. However, the Court suggested that, had she made
fun of him, provocation might well have gone to the jury:
This [the victim’s pointing out that the accused was too drunk to get an
erection] is not evidence capable of supporting the objective element
of the test so as to give an air of reality to the defence of provocation.
It is not evidence of a wrongful insult that, in the circumstances, would
deprive an ordinary person of self-control. The evidence does not go
so far as to suggest that Ms. Parisien mocked, taunted or ridiculed the
appellant or that she might have done those things.89

Being mocked about one’s sexual performance is presumably an upsetting
experience, but it should be one that men are expected to withstand and
not respond to with lethal rage. As will be discussed below, the new
amendments may well rule out provocation in some of these cases.
However, an allegation of an assault, even a minor one, against the accused
by the victim may open the door to provocation in these cases.
4. Women who kill their batterers
Provocation also disadvantages women as accused persons in intimate
partner homicides. The defence is difficult to sustain where women who
have been subjected to ongoing abuse kill their abusers.90 The loss of selfcontrol paradigm and its corresponding suddenness requirement fail to
capture the dynamics of these killings. As Jeremy Horder describes:

87. 2012 BCCA 209, 321 BCAC 295.
88. Ibid at para 63.
89. Ibid at para 64 [emphasis added].
90. See Jeremy Horder, “Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence” (2005)
25:1 Oxford J Leg Stud 123.
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the sense of a privileged access to the defence that may be obtained
by those—perhaps, mainly men—who have a ‘shoot from the hip
mentality’…as compared with those—perhaps, mainly women—whose
response to provocation needs to be more measured because they are
confronting someone known to be stronger and more aggressive.91

Someone whose fear builds slowly over time in response to the
provocative acts of the victim will lose the mitigation if she had time to
for her “passion to cool.”92 Elizabeth Sheehy in her book on defending
battered women on trial makes this point in response to a statement from
the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Malott93 that the accused did not
appear to act in a fit of passion:
This begs the question of what “passion” looks like for battered
women who kill. Is a woman who has been psychologically damaged
and numbed by violence, who appears to be emotionally detached,
necessarily showing “a lack of passion”?94

Sheehy also notes that, while men can often kill women with their bare
hands, women often must resort to weapons which can work against them
in the assessment of suddenness.
The difficulty in raising provocation for abused women highlights the
degree to which the standard at the heart of the defence—loss of selfcontrol—is profoundly gendered and remains rooted in the experience of
heterosexual male rage that is ill-suited to providing mitigation for women
accused. Problems also arise when one looks at killings by men in the
context of a same-sex sexual advance to which we now turn.
5. Provocation and “Homosexual Panic”
As mentioned earlier, the Court in Tran stated that homophobia is not a
characteristic that should be attributed to the ordinary person. Yet postTran, judges have found an air of reality to the defence of provocation
raised by accused men in relation to vicious attacks on men they allege
sexually assaulted them. We have seen three such cases, post-Tran, where
provocation was raised and where the verdict was manslaughter or the
case was sent back for new trial.95 In one of these cases, R. v. Bouchard,96
91. Ibid at 125.
92. In R v Daniels, [1983] NWTJ No 29 (CA) [Daniels] the court recognized this kind of slow fuse
provocation after a long period of abuse by the accused’s spouse, but this case is exceptional.
93. (1996), 30 OR (3d) 609 (CA), aff’d [1998] 1 SCR 123.
94. Sheehy, Defending Battered Women, supra note 11 at 271.
95. R v Peterson, 2012 MBQB 305, 285 Man R (2d) 172 [Peterson]; R v Bouchard, 2013 ONCA
791, 305 CCC (3d) 240, 314 OAC 113 [Bouchard ONCA], aff’d 2014 SCC 64, [2014] 3 SCR 283
[Bouchard SCC] new trial ordered; Rasberry, supra note 49.
96. Bouchard ONCA, ibid.
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the new trial was granted on the basis that the provocation was relevant
to a lack of mens rea, and in another, R. v. Rasberry,97 the accused also
testified that the victim threatened to sexually assault both him and his
wife. As further discussed below, in these three cases, as well as one
known as KRB,98 decided shortly before Tran, and R. v. Rothgordt 99 in
which the defence was found to have an air of reality at the accused’s first
trial, the assumed ordinariness of homophobic rage played a role. Selfdefence would have been a more appropriate defence in all of these cases,
but the decisions are based on provocation because the excessive force
used precluded self-defence. In the light of recent judicial and legislative
efforts to limit the defence of provocation, it is important to consider the
continued salience of “homosexual panic” as a basis for the defence, even
though these cases are not numerous.
In R. v. Peterson,100 the accused testified that he killed his friend and
associate in the drug trade after the accused awoke one evening and found
the victim, another man, attempting to perform oral sex on him. The accused
struck the victim at least nine times with a hammer, crushing his skull.
The forensic evidence showed that the victim was either incapacitated
or unconscious when many of the blows were struck. Provocation was
left with the jury and they convicted the accused of manslaughter. In the
course of her reasons for sentence, the judge stated that the jury must have
concluded that the victim attempting to perform oral sex on the accused
“would have caused a reasonable person in his circumstances to lose selfcontrol.”101
In Rothgordt the accused killed a man he met in an online chat room
for men interested in sex with other men.102 The accused did not testify
but the defence relied on his statement to the police in which he alleged
that the victim had come on to him without his consent. At the first trial,
provocation was left with the jury, along with intoxication and self-defence,

97. Rasberry, supra note 49.
98. R v KRB, 2007 NBQB 359, 321 NBR (2d) 371, [2007] NBJ No 413 (QL) [KRB]. The accused
successfully raised provocation in a judge-alone trial. He testified that the victim, another man who
was his friend, sexually assaulted him while asleep in the friend’s car. KBR testified that he pushed the
friend away, jumped out of the car and grabbed a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle from the backseat, fatally
shooting his friend in the chest. The reasons for decision do not indicate the nature of the alleged
sexual assault.
99. In R v Rothgordt, 2013 BCCA 37 [Rothgordt], the defence was left with the jury at the accused’s
first trial, but failed on the merits. The second trial was by judge alone and Justice Arnold-Bailey found
no basis for provocation. The accused has again appealed his conviction for second degree murder.
100. Peterson, supra note 95.
101. Ibid at para 22.
102. R v Rothgordt, supra note 99.
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but the jury convicted him of second degree murder.103 As in Peterson, the
killing was very violent: the accused struck the victim numerous times in
the head with a hammer.104
Even when provocation fails, evidence that an accused was provoked
is relevant to mens rea and may have the impact of reducing a murder
conviction to manslaughter. In Bouchard,105 for example, the accused
and the victim were former coworkers and friends who often drank
together. There was some evidence of prior sexual activity between the
two men. On the night of the killing, the two men had gone to a concert
and become “quite drunk” by the time the concert ended. The victim had
allegedly made several sexual advances earlier in the evening that had
been rebuffed. The provoking act occurred when the victim planted a “wet
kiss” on the accused’s cheek and told the accused that he loved him. The
accused then stomped the victim to death, leaving him in tall grass several
metres from the road. The accused testified that the “wet kiss” brought
back memories of a babysitter who had sexually assaulted him as a child.
Two defences were put to the jury: a lack of mens rea for murder and
provocation. The jury rejected both defences and convicted the accused
of second degree murder. Again, we question putting provocation to the
jury in this case. Is a single kiss, and a protestation of love, evidence of
an insult that is sufficiently serious that it could generate a loss of selfcontrol in an ordinary person? The jury evidently answered this question
in the negative, but the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the accused’s
appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the victim’s conduct was
relevant to the overall inquiry into whether the accused had the requisite
mens rea for murder. In other words, provoking conduct that falls short
of the requirements of s. 232 may nonetheless be sufficient to negate the
accused’s mens rea for murder. The Court held that when evidence of
provocation is used to negate the mens rea for murder, the limits imposed
by the statutory definition of provocation, such as the “ordinary person”
requirement, do not apply. This result was upheld by the SCC without
reasons.106
The decision in Bouchard is problematic for several reasons. First,
allowing provocation to go to the jury in this case, necessarily embraces
103. Ibid. The accused was initially convicted of second degree murder, but this conviction was
set aside due to improper jury instructions (2013 BCCA 37). At his second trial, the accused was
convicted of second degree murder (2014 BCSC 1215, [2014] BCJ No 1398 (QL)). This decision was
overruled on appeal, 2017 BCCA 230.
104. Ibid. See also KRB, supra note 98.
105. Bouchard ONCA, supra note 95.
106. Bouchard SCC, supra note 95. Bouchard was convicted of murder at the second trial: R v
Bouchard, 2016 ONSC 4484.
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homophobic assumptions about responses to non-violent same-sex
advances by affirming the reasoning that it is ordinary to respond to a nonviolent same-sex advance, such as a “wet kiss,” with lethal violence.107
Second, Bouchard opens a back door into a manslaughter verdict
even where an ordinary person would not have lost self-control (albeit
through the doctrinal route of negating the mens rea for murder). This is
particularly problematic because there will be no safeguard of an objective
test to ensure that unreasonable responses based on toxic masculinity or
homophobia will not serve as mitigating factors.108
The Canadian Judicial Council’s model jury charge on provocation
includes a mention in a footnote that the characteristic of homophobia
should not be attributed to the ordinary person.109 However, juries are to be
instructed that the accused’s gender and sexual orientation should be taken
into account to the extent they are relevant. Yet to do so in these cases
can be problematic. In Rothgordt, where the defence theory was that the
accused was sexually curious or confused, jury speculation about his sexual
orientation (which was not at all clear) does not assist in understanding the
nature of the alleged insult unless the ordinary person can be homophobic.
Unspoken in these cases is the idea that, if the accused had been gay
himself, provocation might not be available. The decision at the second
trial in Rothgordt provides a rare example of a court taking these concerns
seriously. Justice Arnold-Bailey stated, “Moreover, in this day and age I
do not consider it likely that ‘homosexual panic’ will often, if ever, provide
a valid basis upon which to find provocation.”110
Remember that the example given by Dickson CJ in Hill of when
personal characteristics might be relevant was that of a racialized accused
being subjected to a racist insult. The analogy for sexual orientation would
be a gay man or woman losing self-control as a result of a homophobic
insult. The facts in R. v. Reid111 come close to the kind of insult envisioned

107. The alleged conduct by victims in other homosexual panic cases (e.g., Peterson, Rasberry)
cannot be considered “non-violent” and we do not mean to suggest that sexual assaults—whether
experienced by men or women—are not violent acts. As discussed further below, the relevant defence
in such cases should be self-defence and any limitations within that defence should be addressed
directly rather than through provocation.
108. If a killing is reduced from murder to manslaughter based on a lack of mens rea, the defence of
provocation should not arise given that it only applies to killings that are otherwise murder. The first
question should be the mens rea question and only if the intent to kill is found should provocation be
considered.
109. Canadian Judicial Council, “Provocation—In force July 16, 2015,” online: Canadian Judicial
Council <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/lawyers_en.asp?selMenu=lawyers_provocation_en.asp>.
110. Rothgordt, supra note 99.
111. 2015 BCSC 835 [Reid].
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in Hill. The facts suggest that the accused was born intersex,112 raised as a
boy, and as an adult had surgery to transition to be a woman. The accused
engaged in what was found to be a consensual sexual encounter with a man
who, on discovering she was transgender, started berating her viciously,
calling her a faggot and other epithets. The victim also allegedly assaulted
her, to which she responded with deadly force, hitting him several times
with a baseball bat and causing his death. The defence of self-defence
failed in this case because it was found that the force used by the accused
was excessive. Silverman J. recognized that one’s “gender and sexual
identity” is relevant to the provocation inquiry. In particular, he accepted
the Crown’s concession that the victim’s words and actions “could be taken
as a dehumanizing attack on Ms. Reid’s sense of identity and self-worth,
as gender is a legitimate core aspect of self-identity and self-worth.”113 The
accused was convicted of manslaughter on the basis of provocation. In our
view, any principled basis to mitigate Reid’s sentence in this case should
be rooted in an understanding that she was defending herself against a
man who, it seems, flew into a transphobic rage at the realization she
was transgender. It is only necessary to shoehorn our desire to mitigate
the sentence here into the ill-fitting defence of provocation because the
mandatory minimum sentences for murder preclude consideration of the
circumstances of the accused.
Self-defence should, of course, be open to both men and women who
are defending themselves against sexual or other assaults but that defence
requires that the defensive response be reasonable in the circumstances.114
We are not saying that an accused responding violently to a sexual assault
should never form the basis for mitigation of a murder sentence, but rather
that the presumed sexual orientation of the victim should not render a sexual
assault a provocative act based on some discriminatory construction of
masculinity. While women are overwhelmingly more likely to be victims

112. The decision uses the word “hermaphrodite” which is considered a stigmatizing term. See
Intersex Society of North America, “On the Word ‘Hermaphrodite,’” online: <http://www.isna.org/
node/16>.
113. Reid, supra note 111 at para 100.
114. It is interesting to note that when the defence of provocation was abolished in the Australian state
of Victoria, a new offence of “defensive homicide” was introduced. Ramsey, supra note 17. Some
have argued that the notion of a mitigated form of “defensive homicide” in fact brings in through
the back door values that were rejected in the provocation context: see, e.g., Tyson, “Victoria’s New
Homicide Laws,” supra note 55 at 212-214; Hunter & Tyson, “The Implementation of Feminist Law
Reforms,” supra note 17.
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of sexual assault, we do not see women responding to unwanted sexual
advances (whether heterosexual or same-sex) with lethal violence.115
II. Assessing the amendments
On 16 July 2015 amendments to subsection 232(2) were enacted as part of
the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act.116 As mentioned
above, the wrongful act or insult has been replaced by “conduct of the
victim that would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is
punishable by five or more years of imprisonment.”
The apparent justification for the changes was to prevent perpetrators
of so-called “honour killings” from invoking the provocation defence.
Then Immigration Minister Chris Alexander made a connection between
the need to deter honour killings and the amendments before the Senate
Standing Committee:
The defence of honour as a basis for provocation has been used dozens of
times in Canada and its very existence under our criminal law weakens
the defence that women and girls deserve to have in their own homes
from their own relatives. We should not be allowing there to be any
concept of family honour, however construed, as a mitigating factor for
the murder of a family member.…It could be used in the future and its
very existence sends a message to men….That their honour is somehow
at stake and could be used to defend them in a court of law from the
charge of murder.117

When pressed on these “dozens” of cases, the only case the Minister could
name was R. v. Stone,118 a case in which provocation was probably the
reason for reducing a spousal murder to manslaughter but there was no
evidence that the accused was a racialized man. The authors have not been
able to find a single case where provocation has succeeded in the context

115. The only case that we are aware of where a woman killed in response to sexual violence is R v
Magliaro, [1981] NSJ No 115 where the accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter after killing a man
who, after apparently consensual sex, forced her to perform fellatio. The accused had been sexually
assaulted as a teenager and had a history of mental health issues.
116. Bill S-7, supra note 43.
117. Senate, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Evidence, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, Issue 14
(4 December 2014).
118. Stone, supra note 86.
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of a so-called spousal honour killing.119 So-called honour killings do
happen in Canada, although relatively rarely compared to spousal killings
generally.120 It is, therefore, important to consider the implications of this
provision beyond the context of “honour” killings. Statements of the then
Minister reveal that the government was trying to limit the defence to
cases where the victim assaulted the accused:
On the defence of provocation, we’re very confident of the amendment
that is proposed here. We’re saying that the only provocation that might
be acceptable in a court of law is very serious violence by the victim.
Indictable offences punishable by up to five years or more are violent
offences.121

There are two significant changes in the new s. 232. First, the term “act or
insult” has been changed to “conduct.” It is not clear whether this would
rule out words alone as the basis for provocation or whether words can
constitute conduct. Regardless, the second change requiring an indictable
offence would mean that the only possible words that could trigger
provocation would be those that constitute assault,122 possibly the crime
of uttering threats under s. 264.1 or criminal harassment under s. 264. The
second and more important change is the requirement that the conduct
of the victim constitute an indictable offence subject to imprisonment of
five years or more. This new criterion tells us little about how Canadian
society expects an ordinary person to react. It is a somewhat arbitrary
line that is devoid of context as to the types of indictable offences that
119. Fournier and her colleagues found that there were two cases (both before Tran was decided) in
which provocation was successful for a non-Western/Canadian accused killing an intimate partner
in their data but in neither of these cases was there a claim based on “honour”: Fournier, McDougall
& Dekker, supra note 45. In Li, supra note 45 the Court of Appeal upheld a successful provocation
case for a non-Western accused who killed his wife in anger after they had argued and had apparently
engaged in a minor struggle. There was no mention of honour in the case, nor was there any indication
that the killing was connected to the accused’s beliefs about what was acceptable in his culture. Nor
was there any suggestion of culture being relevant to the defence in R c Chouaiby, 1994 CanLII 5910
(QCCA).
120. A rare example is the much-publicized Shafia case in which a young woman’s father, mother, and
brother were convicted of first degree murder in her death, and the deaths of three other female family
members, and those convictions upheld on appeal: supra note 45.
121. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Evidence, 41st Parl,
2nd Sess, No 43 (31 March 2015). As will be discussed further below, these amendments are similar
to those enacted in New South Wales, Australia in 2014, particularly with the new requirement of an
indictable offence punishable by five years in prison. The five-year indictable offence rule in the New
South Wales reforms was cited with approval by government Members of Parliament in the Canadian
debates. See, e.g., House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 187 (23 March 2015) at 1705
(Hon D Ablonczy). However, the Australian reforms go further than the Canadian ones. See below, the
text accompanying notes 161-165.
122. Section 265 of the Criminal Code, supra note 10, includes within the definition of assault the
threatened application of force.
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make the subsequent homicide deserving of our compassion. For example,
there are property-based offences that are subject to five years or more
of imprisonment. Should lethal violence ever be mitigating in response
to provocation that involves only a deprivation of property? We have the
somewhat bizarre situation that a theft over $5000 could trigger provocation
whereas a theft under $5000 could not, based on their respective maximum
punishments. Minister Alexander was comforted by his assumption that
these cases would not arise.123 But what if, for example, a woman, on
leaving an abusive spouse, takes some valuable property belonging to
the accused? Will his defence of provocation be assessed only from the
perspective of someone who had his property stolen or will it be seen from
the perspective of a man whose property was stolen by his wife as she left
him?
How will the changes to the requisite provoking conduct impact the
other requirements of the defence? For example, will the ordinary person
inquiry, which has played such a central role in the defence of provocation,
be largely subsumed by the assessment of whether the victim committed an
indictable offence? In other words, once the indictable offence threshold
has been met, will that make it more likely that the ordinary person standard
can be satisfied or will these two elements remain distinct?
It is likely that most of the cases arising under this new defence will
involve situations where self-defence or possibly defence of property
could also be argued.124 Particularly for triggering offences like sexual
assault and assault, the new provocation defence in essence becomes a
defence of failed self-defence, where the excessive use of force may lead
to a compromise verdict of manslaughter under the guise that the person
lost self-control after being provoked by the assault. Whether we need
a compromise verdict of manslaughter where excessive force is used in
self-defence is a legitimate inquiry but not one that should be addressed
through a distinct loss-of-control-based defence. Self-defence is based on
a calculated decision about what kind of force is necessary to protect one’s
life or bodily integrity, not on out-of-control rage.
The interaction between self-defence and provocation under the new
defence is demonstrated by the first appellate decision to address the new

123. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Evidence, 41st Parl,
2nd Sess, No 43 (31 March 2015).
124. Roach et al, supra note 48 at 405, suggest that “[T]he most likely—indeed perhaps the only—
offence to qualify under this provision is assault but this raises the question of why accused would rely
on provocation when he or she in such a case could claim self-defence if they can argue under s. 34
that they also [were] acting to defend themselves and their acts are reasonable in the circumstances.”
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amendments. The Court of Appeal in Rasberry125 appears to apply the
new amendments to provocation even though the killing took place in
2013 before s. 232 was amended. Because the Crown was appealing the
subjective component of the defence, the appellate Court assumed that the
objective component could be established through the allegation of sexual
assault. Because the alleged insult in this case was sexual assault, the
defence would have been available whether or not the amendments were
in effect and the Crown had in fact conceded the objective component
of the test. The accused in Rasberry was charged with the murder of a
neighbour. After a friendly night of drinking with his wife, the victim, and
another male friend, the accused was ultimately left alone with the victim
in the Rasberry home while his wife was upstairs in bed. According to the
accused’s statement to police, the victim suddenly grabbed the accused
and pushed him backwards over the kitchen counter, threatened to anally
rape him, and said that if Rasberry didn’t cooperate the victim would go
upstairs and rape the accused’s wife. The accused then inflicted 23 stab
wounds and 14 slash wounds on the victim using three kitchen knives. The
accused called 911 and said there was a man dying on his floor who had
tried to have anal intercourse with him. Both men were highly intoxicated
and of roughly the same size although the accused told police the victim
was much stronger than him.
The trial judge was explicitly skeptical about Rasberry’s account of the
events but held that the Crown had failed to disprove provocation beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Crown challenged the manslaughter verdict on
appeal, arguing that there was no air of reality to the subjective component
of provocation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judge’s decision that
the Crown had failed to disprove the subjective component beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Court also found that there was evidence on which
the trial judge could conclude that what started out as self-defence evolved
into provocation when the accused lost his self-control and used excessive
force.
Rasberry is an example of provocation being used as a defence of
excessive force in self-defence. Our concern with the new legislation is
that the mere allegation of an assault on the part of the victim may be
sufficient to trigger the defence of provocation. In Rasberry, his statements
to police and the 911 operator were the only evidence of sexual assault.
The accused did not testify and there was no physical evidence supporting
sexual assault. Given that the accused only has to raise a reasonable doubt

125. Rasberry, supra note 49.
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that an indictable offence was committed by the victim, this amendment
may not be successful in significantly limiting the defence.
It is difficult to glean enough detail about the facts from the Court of
Appeal judgment in Rasberry to give an opinion on the merits of the case,
although clearly the trial judge was skeptical about Rasberry’s version of
the events.126 We agree that people who are sexually assaulted have a right
to defend themselves and whether the force used was proportionate must
be assessed in the context of any violence the accused was experiencing.
However, we worry that this will now become the paradigm case of
provocation and that a mere allegation of assault or sexual assault will
trigger the availability of the defence.
When one takes such a bright line approach to amending a defence
as complicated as provocation, it is likely that one will close down some
problematic aspects of the defence, while at the same time making the
defence unavailable in cases that might warrant compassion. With respect
to provocation being used to justify violence against women, superficially
these changes appear to rule out some of the problematic cases. For
example, announcing an intent to leave a relationship, or criticizing an
accused’s sexual prowess do not constitute indictable offences and thus
would not trigger a defence of provocation. However, where men kill their
intimate partners, there is often an allegation that she assaulted him by
scratching his penis,127 throwing a beer bottle at him,128 coming after him
with a knife,129 or some other means.130 The burden on the Crown to prove
that the victim did not assault the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is
challenging given that the victim is dead. In her study of sentencing for
intimate femicide, Grant found that provocation was more likely to be
successful in cases where there had been some, often trivial, act of force
on the part of the deceased woman.131 In deciding whether provocation
goes to the jury, a mere assertion that the victim struck the accused may be
sufficient in these contexts. We also have concerns about the new limits on
the defence for women who kill abusive spouses. What if the actions of the
deceased were subtle words suggesting that violence would follow, in the
context of an abusive relationship? Will those words alone constitute an
indictable offence subject to more than five years’ imprisonment? Uttering
126. Ibid at para 22.
127. Angelis, supra note 49.
128. R v Strong (1996), 17 OTC 252.
129. R c Kenol, 2016 QCCA 509 [Kenol].
130. In R v Montgomery, 1997 ABCA 301 the accused had “visible marks of trauma” on his face,
apparently from an assault by his spouse before he killed her.
131. See Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63 at 810.
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threats is a possibility but heavily veiled threats may not be as apparent to
an outside observer. The loss of self-control framework says nothing about
a woman who kills her abusive spouse while he is asleep.132 Is there room
to look at past conduct, or potential future conduct? Such cases speak more
to the inadequacy of our understanding of self-defence than to a defence
of provocation. Despair, fear, and hopelessness may motivate such killings
but they are rarely premised on a sudden, unforeseen loss of self-control.
The new amendments do nothing to limit the use of provocation in the
context of same-sex advances. An unwanted “wet kiss” as in Bouchard is
a sexual assault and thus does not rule out a defence of provocation where
the accused responds with lethal violence even though it is unlikely such
a sexual assault would ever have been prosecuted, let alone by indictment.
If the doctrine of self-defence is not sufficiently flexible to address
these situations, then our attention should be focused on developing that
defence, and deciding when excessive force in self-defence warrants a
compromise manslaughter verdict, rather than treating them as instances
of provocation based on the assumption that ordinary heterosexual men fly
into a homicidal rage at the thought of sex with another man.
There are numerous issues around how the defence operates that will
need clarification. It is the role of the judge to decide whether there is an
air of reality on every element of the defence of provocation justifying
putting it to the jury. What will be required to create an air of reality that
a completed or attempted sexual assault has been committed? Will mens
rea be addressed? What if the victim of the provoked killing honestly
believed that the accused was consenting to his sexual advances? Will the
Crown be tasked with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim
took reasonable steps to inquire into consent?133 Or will a mere assertion
by the defence always be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that an
offence was committed by the victim? These amendments lack the nuance
and care that has gone into reforming provocation in other common law
jurisdictions which provide alternatives that should have at least been
considered before amending the defence. It is to these jurisdictions that
we now turn.

132. See R v Whynot (1994), 147 NSR (2d) 111 (CA); Lavallee, supra note 59.
133. Canadian Bar Association, “Submission: Bill S-7: Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural
Practices Act” (April 2015) 1 at 13-14 (concluding that “In our view, each option for conducting
the “air of reality” assessment is fraught with complexity and would add significant time to criminal
trials”).
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III. Options for reform
1. Lessons from other jurisdictions
England, Australia, and New Zealand have undertaken significant revisions
of the provocation defence over the past decade, largely in response to
concerns about men raising the defence after killing their intimate partners
and the limits on the defence for battered women who kill their abusers.
Any examination of potential reform options from other jurisdictions must
take into account the differing sentencing regimes for the crime of murder.
Abolition of provocation has a different meaning in a jurisdiction where
mandatory sentences prevent meaningful consideration of mitigating
circumstances in sentencing. In response largely to feminist criticism, three
Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand134 have abolished provocation.
None of these jurisdictions currently has mandatory minimum sentences
for murder. For example, in Tasmania, the first Australian jurisdiction
to abolish provocation in 2003,135 mandatory minimums for murder had
already been abolished in 1995.136 This context was explicitly relied on to
justify abolishing the defence of provocation.
In 2005, Victoria, a jurisdiction with no mandatory minimum sentence
for murder, became the second jurisdiction in Australia to abolish
provocation.137 This change was made in response to recommendations
made in a Victorian Law Reform Commission Report which were critical
of the gender bias inherent in the defence.138 According to the Report, the
defence was not only used to justify male violence against women, but the
requirement of a sudden triggering event had made it difficult for women
to successfully use it.139 The Report also found that the defence promoted
a culture of victim blaming, and that the legal test was conceptually
difficult to apply.140 The Law Commission recommended that “factors that
decrease a person’s culpability for an intentional killing should be taken
into account at sentencing rather than form the basis of a separate partial
defence.”141

134. Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 2009 (NZ), 2009/64.
135. Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas).
136. Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s 158.
137. Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 3.
138. Victorian Law Reform Commission, “Defences to Homicide: Final Report” (Melbourne:
Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2004) at 27-31.
139. Ibid at 27. The authors of the Report noted that in their review of the case law that was current
at the time of the Report’s publication, only three women raised provocation at trial and none of them
were successful (at 28-29).
140. Ibid at 32-33, 35-36.
141. Ibid at 55.
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The Victorian Parliament’s repeal of provocation was part of a
package of reforms. In addition to repealing provocation, the legislature
established the offence of “defensive homicide,” clarified the requirements
for self-defence, and broadened the scope of admissibility for evidence
of abuse in relationships. The new offence of defensive homicide was
intended to be, “a safety net for those who kill in response to family
violence but who do not meet the test for self-defence because their belief
in the necessity to defend themselves did not have reasonable grounds.”142
The offence had the same maximum penalty as manslaughter. Defensive
homicide was the subject of much criticism on two grounds. First, it had
been suggested that this offence could have a problematic net-widening
effect, resulting in manslaughter convictions for women who kill abusive
partners, rather than acquittals on the basis of self-defence.143 Second,
the defence was criticized for allowing evidence of provocation for men
who kill their female intimate partners, thereby reviving provocation
through the back door.144 Tyson, for example, points to a 2010 decision,
R. v. Middendorp,145 in which a man with a history of domestic violence
was convicted of defensive homicide, and not murder, after stabbing his
spouse four times in the back. This case sparked public outrage146 and
triggered the Department of Justice to initiate a review of how the offence
was being applied, especially in the context of gendered and domestic
violence. However, the consensus among feminists appeared to be that the
offence should be retained, largely out of concern that self-defence alone
might not be adequate to deal with cases in which women kill abusive
partners.147 Despite these concerns, the Victorian Parliament repealed
defensive homicide in September 2014 but also strengthened the protection
for battered women under the law of self-defence by making self-defence
available to an accused “in the context of family violence” even where the
harm threatened is not immediate and where the force used is in excess

142. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 9AD, as created by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 6 and repealed
by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 3(3); Sheehy, Stubbs &
Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide,” supra note 55 at 478.
143. Tyson, “Victoria’s New Homicide Laws,” supra note 55 at 211.
144. Ibid at 212-214; Tyson, Sex, Culpability and Provocation, supra note 75 at 122-124.
145. R v Middendorp, [2010] VSC 202.
146. Tyson, Sex, Culpability and Provocation, supra note 75 at 122-123.
147. See, e.g., Danielle Tyson, Sarah Capper & Debbie Kirkwood, Submissions for the Review of the
offence of defensive homicide (2010), Dept of Justice, Victoria (AUS), 13 September 2011.
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of the harm threatened or actually inflicted.148 Finally, Victoria reformed
its evidence laws to ensure that evidence about family violence would
be admitted in homicide proceedings to explain the context in which the
person killed as well as the social, psychological and economic factors that
can affect family violence victims.149 Victoria is seen to have gone further
to protect women both as accused persons and as victims than any other
jurisdiction and could, we believe, provide a model on which Canadian
law could be based.150
In Western Australia, mandatory minimums for murder were abolished
along with the defence of provocation in 2008.151 This change was part of
a package of reforms that were the result of a Law Reform Commission
Report152 which noted the problematic nature of “male honour” as a source
of mitigation and the complexity of the defence.153
Several other Australian jurisdictions have limited the scope of the
defence. In Queensland, for example, where the legislature was not
prepared to abolish mandatory minimums, significant changes were
made to the defence of provocation. Queensland has gone the furthest
to deal with spousal homicides, limiting the application of the defence
in the context of domestic relationships where the provocative act was
done to leave the relationship, to change the nature of the relationship, or
to indicate that the relationship should change.154 These limits also apply
where the victim has already ended the relationship.155 Queensland has
also put the burden of proof on the accused to prove provocation156 and has
explicitly provided that words alone will not constitute provocation “other
than in circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character.”157
148. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 322M; Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act
2014. To be successfully pled, the accused must prove “a subjective belief that the actions taken in
self-defence were necessary, and that belief must have been based on reasonable grounds…even if
the accused person is responding to a harm that is not immediate, or his or her response involves the
use of force in excess of the force involved in the harm or threatened harm.” Tyson, “Victoria’s New
Homicide Laws” supra note 55 at 210 (citations omitted); see also Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 9AD, as
created by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 6 and repealed by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of
Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 3(3).
149. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 9AH(3)(a)–(f), as created by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 6
and repealed by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 3(3).
150. Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide,” supra note 55 at 483.
151. Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA).
152. Austl, Western Australia, Law Reform Commission, A review of the law of homicide (Perth:
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, 2007), online: Law Reform Commission of Western
Australia <http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/P/project_97.aspx>.
153. Ibid at 202-216.
154. Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 304(3).
155. Ibid, s 304(6).
156. Ibid, s 304(9).
157. Ibid, s 304(2).
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Queensland also enacted a partial defence of “killing for preservation in an
abusive domestic relationship.”158 This provision reduces to manslaughter
killings where the deceased had a history of domestic violence against
the accused and the accused believed that killing was necessary to protect
herself.159 Most recently, the Queensland Parliament passed a Bill aiming
to abolish the “homosexual panic” aspect of the partial defence which,
once in force, will amend its Criminal Code to specifically exclude an
“unwanted sexual advance” except in cases of “exceptional character.”160
Canada’s amendments to provocation appear to be modelled on those
enacted in 2014 in New South Wales, creating a new defence of extreme
provocation that retained a loss-of-control standard and an ordinary person
test.161 Section 23 of the Crimes Act 1900 provides that the conduct of
the victim must be directed at the accused and must constitute a serious
indictable offence.162 These reforms were largely motivated by concerns
158. Ibid, s 304B, introduced by Criminal Code (Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another
Matter) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld), s 3. This was the result of recommendations made in the report:
Austl, Queensland, Homicide in Abusive Relationships: A Report on Defences (Report prepared for
the Attorney-General and Minister for Industrial Relations) by Geraldine Mackenzie & Eric Colvin
(Brisbane: 2009).
159. The provision reads:
(1) A person who unlawfully kills another (the deceased) under circumstances that, but for the
provisions of this section, would constitute murder, is guilty of manslaughter only, if—
(a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence against the person in the
course of an abusive domestic relationship; and
(b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s preservation from death or
grievous bodily harm to do the act or make the omission that causes the death; and
(c) the person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to the abusive domestic
relationship and all the circumstances of the case.
(2) An abusive domestic relationship is a domestic relationship existing between 2 persons in
which there is a history of acts of serious domestic violence committed by either person against
the other.
(3) A history of acts of serious domestic violence may include acts that appear minor or trivial
when considered in isolation.
(4) Subsection (1) may apply even if the act or omission causing the death (the response) was
done or made in response to a particular act of domestic violence committed by the deceased
that would not, if the history of acts of serious domestic violence were disregarded, warrant the
response.
(5) Subsection (1)(a) may apply even if the person has sometimes committed acts of domestic
violence in the relationship.
(6) For subsection (1)(c), without limiting the circumstances to which regard may be had for the
purposes of the subsection, those circumstances include acts of the deceased that were not acts
of domestic violence.
160. Plater, Line & Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 1 at 17-18.
161. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23. These amendments followed the release of a report by the Select
Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, Austl, New South Wales, Select Committee on the
Partial Defence of Provocation, The Partial Defence of Provocation (Sydney: Select Committee on the
Partial Defence of Provocation, 2013).
162. A serious indictable offence is defined in s 4 of the Crimes Act 1990 as one that is punishable by
imprisonment for at least five years.
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over the use of the defence by men who kill their female intimate partners.163
Significantly, a number of other reforms to the legislation demonstrate that
much more thought went into the New South Wales provisions compared
to their Canadian counterpart. For example, the defence in New South
Wales is limited to situations in which an ordinary person could have lost
self-control “to the extent of intending to kill or inflict grievous bodily
harm on the deceased.” This change directly responds to the critique that
ordinary people do not respond with fatal violence except to the most
extreme provoking behaviour. New South Wales is also explicit that
neither a non-violent sexual advance nor conduct induced by the accused
to provide an excuse can constitute extreme provocation. Further, s. 23(4)
provides tht the provoking conduct need not occur immediately before the
act causing death. Removing the suddenness requirement in this way was
intended to make the defence more available to those who have suffered
ongoing abuse at the hands of an intimate partner.164 However, despite
removal of the suddenness requirement, a step Canada has failed to take,
Kate Fitz-Gibbon argues that the new extreme provocation defence will
reduce access to the defence for battered women who kill even though it
was intended to retain provocation for this group.165
The Australian Capital Territory166 and the Northern Territory167
have both limited the applicability of provocation for non-violent sexual
advances. Both provisions state that a non-violent sexual advance towards
the accused is not in itself sufficient to constitute provocation but may be
considered along with other conduct of the deceased.
England has also taken steps to reform its provocation defence.
As in Canada, a murder conviction carries a mandatory life sentence.
In 2010, the defence of provocation was abolished in England and
Wales and replaced with a new defence based on the loss of control.168
These reforms disregarded the recommendation of Ministry of Justice
Consultation Paper which urged removing loss of control as a requirement
of the defence.169 The new partial defence of loss of control was enacted
163. Kate Fitz-Gibbon, “Homicide Law Reform in New South Wales: Examining the Merits of the
Partial Defence of ‘Extreme’ Provocation” (2017) 40 Melbourne UL Rev 769 at 787; The Partial
Defence of Provocation, supra note 161 at 200.
164. Fitz-Gibbon, ibid at 779, 781.
165. Ibid at 789-791.
166. Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 13(3).
167. Criminal Code 1983 (NT), s 158(5).
168. Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), c 25, ss 54-56. See also Kate Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing
Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control,” (2013) 40:2
JL & Soc’y 280 [Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing Provocation”].
169. UK, Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Commission No 304)
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2006) at 80-84.
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to “better cater for the unique circumstances within which battered women
kill while also providing a provision that excludes defendants who kill
an intimate partner in response to alleged sexual infidelity.”170 In many
respects, the new loss-of-control defence, which is rather complex in its
elements, resembles the defence of provocation. The accused must have
a loss of self-control in response to a qualifying trigger where a person of
the accused’s sex and age, with the normal degree of tolerance and selfrestraint, might have acted in a similar way; essentially the same objective
test as the provocation defence.171 Notably, the loss of self-control need
not be sudden.172 The critical changes, for the purpose of this paper, relate
to what is considered a qualifying trigger of the loss of self-control. In
general, the defence applies where words or conduct cause the accused to
have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged,173 language we saw
in Tran. There is an explicit provision that the accused’s fear of serious
violence from the victim will qualify, opening up the defence to women
who kill their abusers.174 The fact that something said or done constituted
sexual infidelity is to be disregarded175 as is any fear of violence or sense
of being wronged that was incited by the accused to provide an excuse to
use violence.176
The English reforms are somewhat puzzling in that they were animated
by a desire to remove the gender bias from the defence and yet, contrary
to recommendations, loss of control remains the organizing principle.
The UK government did respond to criticisms about this by removing
the suddenness requirement for the loss of self-control and by explicitly
including fear of future violence as a qualifying trigger, two reforms that
we have not seen in the Canadian context. Nonetheless, concerns have
been raised that requiring that an accused must lose control could limit the
defence for women who kill their abusers.177
2. A new approach for Canada: abolishing provocation and mandatory
minimums for murder
In our view the approach taken by Victoria should be considered for
Canada, with the abolition of the mandatory minimum sentence for
murder being crucial to the reform. Through a package of reforms, Victoria
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing Provocation,” supra note 168 at 280.
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, supra note 168, s 54(1)(c).
Ibid, s 54(2).
Ibid, s 55(4).
Ibid, s 55(3).
Ibid, s 55(6)(c).
Ibid, ss 55(6)(a) and (b).
Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing Provocation,” supra note 168 at 290-292.
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abolished provocation but at the same time expanded self-defence so that
the defence might still be open to a battered woman who uses excessive
force to defend herself or who kills an abusive spouse while he is asleep.
We recognize that persuading Parliament to abolish mandatory minimum
sentences for murder would be no easy task. If abolition is not possible
in Canada, we recommend that, at a minimum, reforms along the line of
those adopted in Queensland be pursued. Those reforms explicitly address
problems around men killing their female intimate partners and limit
“homosexual panic” scenarios.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to set the precise details of an
appropriate sentencing scheme for murder and other homicide offences, a
complex task that requires its own paper. The current regime raises grave
concerns about fairness and about the extent to which potentially innocent
accused are under enormous pressure to plead guilty to manslaughter to
avoid these rigid sentences.178 Canada has an extremely harsh sentencing
regime for murder with a mandatory life sentence attached to all murders
and periods of parole eligibility from 10–25 years for second degree
murder179 and 25 years for first degree murder.180 The Harper government
took steps to make this regime even harsher and more inflexible. For
example, it abolished the s. 745 procedure (the so-called “faint hope
clause”) which provided an opportunity for people convicted of murder
to apply for review of parole ineligibility periods greater than 15 years.
Parliament also enacted legislation that allows for parole ineligibility
periods to be made consecutive to one another, resulting in de facto life
without parole sentences.181 The constitutionality of these new, much longer
parole ineligibility periods has not yet been considered by the Supreme
Court. Given the s. 12 Charter jurisprudence prohibiting “cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment,”182 developments in the research about

178. Debra Parkes & Emma Cunliffe, “Women and wrongful convictions: Concepts and challenges”
(2015) 11:3 Intl J L in Context 219; Elizabeth Sheehy, “Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum
Sentences” (2001) 39:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 529 [Sheehy, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences”].
179. Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 745(c).
180. Ibid, s 745(a).
181. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and another Act, SC 2011, c 2. The faint hope clause has
been abolished for all murders which are committed after 2 December 2011. See, e.g., Criminal Code,
s 745.21(1)–745.51 and Canada, Bill C-53, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts, 2nd
Sess, 41st Parl 2015. For examples of cases of 75-year parole ineligibility, see R v Bourque, 2014
NBQB 237, [2014] NBJ No 295 (QL); R v Ostamas, 2016 MBQB 136, [2016] MJ No 197 (QL), 329
Man R (2d) 203; R v Saretzky, 2017 ABQB 496, [2017] AJ No 831 (QL).
182. See, e.g., R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 SCR 773; R v Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13, [2016] 1 SCR 130.
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the impact of long-term imprisonment,183 and increasing international
attention to the human rights implications of life sentences,184 there is good
reason to believe they may be unconstitutional.
Don Stuart has argued that Canada’s murder sentencing regime might
be unconstitutional in the absence of a provocation defence.185 In our
view, the constitutionality of mandatory sentences for murder does not
hinge on the availability of provocation as a defence, but rather on the
lack of a principled mitigation regime to account for the wide range of
circumstances in which intentional killings occur.
We recognize that the abolition of provocation could result in women
who kill their abusive partners losing access to the partial defence where
self-defence fails. Sheehy and her colleagues in Australia and New
Zealand examined how often women raised self-defence and provocation
in their comparative study of defences to homicide for battered women.186
The study found that, in Canada, of the 16 women who went to trial for
killing their abusive spouses between 2000 and 2010, 11 were acquitted
on the grounds of self-defence, a much higher rate than in Australia or
New Zealand. Nineteen additional women pleaded guilty to manslaughter,
although it is unclear how many of these 19 were based on the Crown
assuming that a defence of provocation had a reasonable possibility of
success.187 Because of the high number of guilty pleas, it is difficult to assess
the role of provocation in these cases. However, it does seem reasonable to
posit that while provocation may play less of a role in Canada for battered
women, because of the more contextual approach taken to self-defence,188
provocation was probably the basis for some manslaughter verdicts.189 We
believe that abolishing mandatory minimums for murder would provide
more flexibility for these women than the current gendered defence which
favours sudden losses of self-control and has historically not served women

183. See, e.g., Serena Wright, Ben Crewe & Susie Hulley, “Suppression, denial, sublimation:
Defending against the initial pains of very long life sentences” (2017) 21:2 Theoretical Criminology
225; Alison Liebling & Shadd Maruna, eds, The Effects of Imprisonment (Cullompton: Willan, 2005).
184. Dirk Van Zyl Smit & Catherine Appleton, eds, Life Imprisonment and Human Rights (Oxford:
Hart-Bloomsbury, 2016).
185. Stuart, Coughlan & Delisle, supra note 26. See also Roach et al, supra note 48 at 406 who argue
that arbitrary restrictions on the provocation defence, such as those brought in by the new amendments,
are “ripe for Charter challenge.”
186. Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide,” supra note 55. See also Sheehy, Defending
Battered Women, supra note 11.
187. Ibid. The study (at 486) found one woman who did not proceed to trial, three who proceeded to
trial and were convicted of manslaughter and one who was convicted of murder. Of the 20 guilty pleas
19 were to manslaughter and one was to murder.
188. Lavallee, supra note 59.
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well. We are not the first to argue that provocation should be abolished
along with the harsh mandatory minimum sentences for murder. The
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, for example, supports
the abolition of provocation but only if mandatory minimums for murder
are also abolished.190
We are not arguing that men should be sentenced to more harsh
sentences for murder nor that provoking acts of the victim will never be
relevant to sentencing; but rather that the mitigation regime be redistributed
so that out-of-control rage is not the sole basis for mitigation. By widening
the range of factors that can be considered in mitigation, it is likely that
more accused will benefit from increased flexibility in sentencing. This
approach would also open up the possibility of seriously considering
R. v. Gladue191 factors in sentencing for murder, rather than limiting the
applicability of section 718.2(e) of the Code to a very cursory analysis of
the appropriate period of parole ineligibility for second degree murder.192
We recognize that a regime that provides for mitigation in the
sentencing of murder shifts decision-making power from the jury to the
judge to determine what types of mitigation will be recognized. This in
turn raises the possibility of discriminatory narratives about violence
against women or other vulnerable groups driving sentencing decisions.
Hunter and Tyson, for example, have cautioned that the stereotypes and
victim blaming that animated provocation could well shift into sentencing
decisions given “the tendency for sentencing in cases of domestic homicide
to undermine legal reforms designed to benefit women.”193 However, in
their study examining the impact on sentencing for intimate partner killings
in Victoria after the abolition of provocation they found “a mixed picture
in relation to concerns about the reintroduction of problematic, gendered
provocation narratives at the sentencing stage.”194 In general, they found
such narratives had a minimal impact on sentencing outcomes in domestic
homicide cases. Overall, courts were able to distinguish cases where the
defendant had “a justifiable sense of being wronged” from those where the
alleged mitigation was based on male control over their female partners.195
However, at the level of discourse, problematic provocation narratives

190. The Response of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies to Reforming Criminal
Code Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and Defence of Property, supra note 1, recommendation
38.
191. R v Gladue, 1999 CanLii 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688.
192. See, e.g., R v Paul, 2014 BCCA 81.
193. “The Implementation of Feminist Law Reforms,” supra note 17 at 132.
194. Ibid at 152.
195. Ibid.
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were evident and defence counsel continued to raise such narratives in
sentencing submissions. At the same time, they also saw the emergence
of new discourses denouncing male violence against women, particularly
from women judges.
Conclusion
We have seen some improvements in the way courts have infused meaning
into the defence of provocation over the past decade. Judges are beginning
to reject cases where a woman leaves her spouse,196 threatens to have an
abortion,197 or challenges his sexual prowess.198 Judges are also beginning
to recognize that a non-violent same-sex advance should not cause
someone to lose their self-control and kill.199 However, these positions are
not uniformly applied and, as Rasberry reveals, are always a matter of
interpretation.
By prioritizing rage over other extreme emotions like fear and despair,
the defence of provocation has historically been more applicable to male
rage than to the realities of women who kill. Jurisprudence under the
previous provocation provision demonstrated three problematic themes:
it permitted the excuse of homicidal rage against intimate partners based
on discriminatory assumptions about what is an “ordinary” response to a
woman leaving, or threatening to leave, a relationship, and it permitted
men to argue that lethal violence in response to an advance from
another man was “ordinary.” By contrast, abused women who kill their
abusers have had limited access to the defence. While the amendment to
subsection 232(2) narrows the qualifying triggers to more serious conduct
by the victim, and may preclude the defence where the only provocation
is a woman leaving a relationship, it does nothing to limit the defence
where there is an allegation by the accused that the victim assaulted him
or made a same-sex advance triggering the loss of self-control. We doubt
that the defence of provocation as it exists can be applied in a manner
that is consistent with substantive equality. The Australian experience,
particularly that in Victoria, demonstrates that reform of provocation is
best done in a comprehensive context that looks at all aspects of the crime
of murder, keeping the sentencing regime front and centre in developing
defences and substantive doctrine. This is not how law reform relating to
homicide has proceeded in Canada in recent years. Instead, sentencing
provisions have been added on a piecemeal basis in response to public
196.
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R v Barrett, 2016 ONCA 12.
R c Godbout, 2015 QCCS 6265.
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outcry over particular cases and have consistently ratcheted sentences up,
while individual defences are amended without consideration of other
defences. The defence of provocation will, in our view, remain both overand under-inclusive due to the problematic foundation on which it rests.
We thus urge the government to undertake a re-examination of the defence
of provocation (and potentially self-defence) and the sentencing regime
for murder to consider in a more principled way what kinds of killings are
deserving of our compassion.

